INTRODUCTION
A fundamental premise of Anglo-American jurisprudence, that settlements should always be encouraged, 1 routinely is applied to class action suits. 2 However, because the class action device is unique and does not fit into traditional adjudicatory models,3 the simple extension of this policy to class actions presents special problems. 4 The class action suit is generally thought of as a long, complex, thorough procedure. 5 In reality, the class action suit that is fully tried is a rarity. 6 Most class actions are settled before the merits are judged in court. Because the resulting class action settlement can have a major impact on both plaintiffs and defendants,7 and because class action settlements pose unique problems not ordinarily encountered in traditional litigation, 8 pretrial settlements must be carefully supervised and adequately reviewed. The current pretrial settlement process often leaves unprotected the substantial interests 9 ·involved in a class action case. The process is particularly vulnerable to abuse when the class action suit is brought for economic, as opposed to ideological, reasons. 1° For example, withthe Law -Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318 REv. (1976 [hereinafter cited as Class Action Developments].
5. The class action suit has been characterized as entailing dimensions "beyond anything seen in Anglo-American courts in terms of size, complexity, and longevity. " Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the Class Action Problem, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 667 (1979) .
6. A statistical study of class action suits filed in the District of Columbia found that in 63% of the cases the issue of class certification never reached the court. Of those cases in which certification was granted, 55% were disposed of in favor of the defendant on preliminary motions. Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action : An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123 , 1135 -38 (1974 . Another empirical study focused on the incidence of shareholder and class action suits brought against the 190 largest publicly owned corporations as listed in the 1975 Fortune Magazine rankings. The study showed that 71 % of all suits filed were settled before trial, 17% were dismissed, and another 4% were denied class action status. Only 4% of all class action and stockholder derivative suits were fully litigated. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REv. 542, 545 (1980) Lawsuits, 1971 Lawsuits, -1978 
[hereinafter cited as Empirical Study (II)]; see also Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action

Class actions typically involve important issues that have a significant impact on society.
See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980 ) (school desegregation), cert denied, 450 U. S. 912 (1981) ; In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.) (customer fraud), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979) ; Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978) (employment discrimination), cert denied, 439 U. S. 1115 (1979) .
9. See notes 3 & 4 supra and accompanying text.
10. This Note does not address the abuses that may arise in class action suits brought primarily for ideological purposes. Instead, the Note deals exclusively with the potential for abuse inherent in those class action suits prompted largely by economic considerations. Plaintiff class action suits that are economically motivated have a recognized potential for abuse. They have been depicted by some as "lawyers'" lawsuits in which the "client," the class, serves as little more than the means to generate fees. See Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1978 ), ajfd., 444 U.S. 472 (1980 . As the Supreme Court observed:
That there is a potential for misuse of the class-action mechanism is obvious. Its benefits to class members are often nominal and symbolic, with persons other than class members becoming the chief beneficiaries. But the remedy for abuses does not lie in denying the relief ••• but with re-examination of Rule 23 as to untoward consequences.
Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ; see also Gulf Oil Co. v. Ber- [Vol. 84:308 out court supervision, unscrupulous plaintiffs' attorneys can use the class action allegation to extract an unjustifiably high settlement from a defendant willing to settle for the nuisance value of the suit. 11 The class action process is also abused when the class attorney, who has already settled the case, artificially increases the amount of her fee. 12 In addition, because the economic interests of the attorney and the class may conflict, the attorney may negotiate settlement terms that do not reflect the interests of the absentee class. 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 attempts to address this inherent potential for abuse that exists during the pretrial stage, when there is no court supervision of the class suit, by requiring that all class action settlements be approved by the court. 14 However, in practice, the current judicial scrutiny of class action settlements neither prevents abuse nor effectively protects the interests of the absentee class. 15 This Note explores the problem of abuse of the class action device during the pretrial settlement process. Part I analyzes the underlying sources of potential abuse in pretrial settlement negotiations. Part II assesses the adequacy of the standards currently used by courts to detect collusive class action settlements. Part III concludes that the appointment of a neutral third-party guardian to oversee the pretrial nard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 n.13 (1981) (citing Comment, Judicial Screening of Class Action Communications, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 671, 699-704 (1980) ; 88 HARV. L. REV. 1911 REV. , 1917 REV. -20 (1975 );
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits -The Twenty-
Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1971) ; Simon, Class Actions -Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1973) . When the class action suit has been economically motivated, courts have sought to prevent abuse by looking closely at counsel fees. On occasion, they have rejected percentage fee contracts and settlements in which the attorney's fee is part of the negotiated settlement. See Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977 ) (rejecting settlement where attorney's fee was part of settlement); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, 74 F.R.D. 61, 67 (S.D. Tex. 1977 ) (court has obligation to review the size of class counsel's attorney's fee for reasonableness); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, 55 F.R. D. 221 (N.D. Ill. 1972 ) (court makes its own determination of the reasonable value of the attorneys' services and disregards contingent percentage fee contracts setting attorney fees). Nonetheless, examples of egregious abuses of the class action settlement process are not uncommon. See notes 93 infra and accompanying text. Moreover, as a recent case illustrates, even the most reputable members and firms of the plaintiffs' bar are not immune to the temptation of using the class action mechanism for personal economic profit. In In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R. D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd. in part and revd. in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984) , lawyers claimed 40% or $21,000,000 of the $50,000,000 class award. "Three or four of the most prominent antitrust attorneys," 98 F.R.D. at 73, were implicated in an egregious example of attorney fee abuse: almost all of the legal tasks of the class suit were duplicated and triplicated, 98 F.R.D. at 70, 75; there were more attorneys involved in the litigation than parties at interest, 98 F.R.D. at 68; and at least one-third of the firms intervened after the defendant settled, 98 F.R.D. at 74. During the two years following the settlement, lawyers managed to deplete the class settlement fund by one-third.
11. See note 94 infra and accompanying text. 12. See In Re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1983 ) (of a total fee petition for $20,700,000, only $3,000,000 was accounted for by legal work done prior to the settlement), affd. in part and revd. in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984 negotiation process furthers the judicial policy of encouraging settlements while protecting the interests of the absentee class.
I. THE CLASS ACTION DEVICE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
The Supreme Court has emphasized that class actions "serve an important function in our system of civil justice." 16 One benefit of class actions is that they enable private individuals who share legal claims too small to justify the cost of individual litigation to vindicate their interests in a single lawsuit. 17 As Justice Douglas has stated, class actions provide "one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against those who command the status quo." 18 Society as a whole also benefits because class action litigation can ensure greater compliance with society's laws and regulations and promote the efficient use of scarce judicial resources. 1 9 In order to ensure that these benefits are not lost, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the requirements of the class action suit must be strictly observed. 20 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the following four requirements: (1) numerosity of claims; (2) common issues of law and fact; (3) typicality of the representative party's claim; and ( 4) fair and adequate representation of the class' interests. 21 The last requirement-adequate representation -is central in achieving substantive and procedural fairness in class action suits. 22 This is because in class action suits, unlike traditional litigation, the plaintiffs do not act individually to protect their interests; rather, members of the absentee class rely on the class attorney and representative to pursue their interests vigorously. 23 16. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981) ; see also Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (the legal profession relies on the "private attorney general," facilitated by rule 23, to vindicate legal rights).
17. See Deposit Guaranty Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) The Supreme Court has made clear that the adequacy requirement, as well as due process of law, 24 is satisfied if there has been a "full and fair consideration of the common issue[s]" 25 adjudicated on behalf of the absentee class. Thus, in class action settlements, fairness is contingent on the ability of the class representatives to air all relevant issues during the negotiation process. Unfortunately, the inherent structural weaknesses of the class action suit -strong incentives to settle combined with the relative autonomy of the class action attorney -create a situation in which the interests of the class may not be adequately explored or protected in the settlement discussions. This makes it possible for the class to be bound by an unjust settlement. Settlements that do not inure to the benefit of the absentee class can seriously undermine the class action concept.
A. The Interests of the Various Participants in a Class Action
The interests of the absentee class and those of the class representatives -the class action attorney and the named representativemay conflict during the pretrial settlement negotiations. The class action attorney and the class action representative often have strong incentives to settle before trial. The absentee class, in contrast, seeks to recover as large an award as possible, sometimes attainable only after prolonged litigation. This divergence of interests is not fully checked by the adversary, because the defendant is often strongly motivated to pursue a settlement. 26 Thus, the settlement may accommodate the interests of the defendant and the class action representatives but not those of the class as a whole.
The Defendant
The defendant has both direct and indirect financial incentives to settle. Its most direct and immediate financial objectives are to minimize the amount of the damages eventually awarded to the class and to reduce litigation expenses. 27 The indirect costs of full-scale litiga- REV. 215, 247 (1983) ; Jones, supra note 6, at 546; Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 114 & n.4 (1976) . Litigation expenses include out-of-pocket costs as well as the opportunity cost to the company of diverting its time and resources from productive activities to supervising the lawsuit. tion, however, can also be consequential. Consumer goodwill can be harmed by the adverse publicity that often accompanies class action litigation. Also, the possible disclosure of "dirty linen" during the trial process can damage the defendant's community standing. In addition, the discovery process can disrupt the day-to-day operations of defendant institutions and corporations. By settling, the defendant can minimize most of these indirect costs and avoid the risk of a large damage award.
The Named Plaintiff
The system governing the payment of attorneys' fees provides the named plaintiff with an economic incentive to settle before trial. If the suit is unsuccessful, the named plaintiff is responsible for legal expenses. 28 [T]his Court has recognized consistently that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole. The common fund doctrine reflects the traditional practice in courts of equity, and it stands as a well-recognized exception to the general principle that requires every litigant to bear his own attorney's fees. The doctrine rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to court costs are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant's expense. Jurisdiction over the fund involved in the litigation allows a court to prevent this inequity by assessing attorney's fees against the entire fund, thus spreading fees proportionately among those benefited by the suit. (Citations omitted).
31. Under the common fund doctrine, all members of the class must bear the costs and share the rewards of the fund equally. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gernert, 444 U.S. 472, 478-82 (1980) ; Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U. S. 240, 264-65 n.39 (1975) . The Court in Boeing explained that unequal shares of the settlement fund are appropriate only in cases in which the number of claimants is small, benefits can be traced with some accuracy, and the cost of the litigation can be shifted, with some confidence, to those benefiting. These characteristics, the Court noted, are not usually present where "litigants simply vindicate a general social grievance." 444 U.S. at 478-79 (citing Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 263-67 n.39).
[ Vol. 84:308 tion -provides another incentive for the named plaintiff to settle. For the named plaintiff, the risk of losing at trial is counterbalanced solely by the chance of an award larger than that offered for settlement. However, because all members of the class, including the named plaintiff, share equally in the additional reward, the incremental benefit of a larger award may not sufficiently compensate the plaintiff for her extra efforts in litigating the case. Thus, the named plaintiff may choose to minimize the cost of her involvement by settling promptly rather than becoming involved in prolonged litigation. 32
The Class Attorney
Like the named plaintiff, the class attorney may have incentives to settle rather than litigate a class action lawsuit. Obviously, the costs of full-scale litigation are far greater than those of pretrial settlement. In theory, the attorney is not at financial risk if the litigation is unsuccessful, because the named representative is then responsible for paying her legal expenses. 33 In practice, however, the named representative is often a private individual who is unable to reimburse the attorney for the full cost of the class action. In these situations, the class attorney has usually advanced the costs of the class action, expecting to be reimbursed only if the suit is successful. 34 Thus, if the attorney takes the case to trial and loses, she will be out the time and money required to litigate a class action suit. 35 If the class attorney settles the suit, how-32. This analysis can be extended to the situation of individual class members. If class members seek to maximize their income, and iftheir individual stake in the class action is low relative to the costs of supervision and direct involvement, the class member will remain a passive partici- (1983) ; see also Class Action Developments, supra note 4, at 1618-23 (arguing that ban on maintenance in the class action context is an unjustifiable obstacle to class suits). Since the major cost of the class action litigation is the attorney's own fee, maintenance of class actions is much like a contingent fee arrangement. As in contingent fee contracts, the class attorney will most likely recover a full fee only if the class suit is successful. Thus, the attorney, not the class, absorbs the full cost of defeat in class action suits. The attorney therefore has a tremendous incentive to settle, particularly in high risk litigation. The speculative nature of class action litigation has prompted several authors to characterize the class action attorney as an "entrepreneur." See Coffee, supra note 27, at 231; Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 60 (1975) ; Herzel & Hagan, Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees in Derivative and Class ever, she will be entitled under the common fund doctrine to recover her full fee from the settlement fund. 36 By settling, then, the attorney obtains a certain fee and eliminates the risk that she will incur significant expenses for which she will not be compensated. 37 Even if the prospects for success in the litigation are high, the attorney may nonetheless have a strong incentive to settle. As Judge Friendly observed in the context of a shareholders' derivative action, the class attorney's financial interest lies in the amount of her award less the time and effort required to produce it. 38 The attorney may therefore benefit more from a "small settlement . . . bearing a higher ratio to the cost of the work than a much larger recovery obtained only after extensive discovery, a long trial and an appeal." 39 Thus, even the prospect of a large recovery may not be sufficient to cause the class attorney to forgo a settlement that is unfavorable to the members of the absentee class. 40 Actions, LITIGATION, Winter 1981, at 25. Professor Coffee has argued that one way to remedy the potential for abuse that exists in class action suits is to view the class action as entrepreneurial litigation and allow the attorney to acquire a property interest in that litigation. Under Coffee's proposed system, an attorney could no longer intervene in a class suit that had been settled; the attorney who originally filed would maintain exclusive control of the class claim and be the exclusive recipient of the resulting fee. According to Coffee, this would reduce the need for attorneys to generate a multitude of class action suits in order to spread the risks of an unsuccessful suit. Herzel and Hagan argue that the present "lodestar'' formula -which takes irito account the number of hours worked, the hourly rate, the difficulty of the litigation, and the quality of the attorney's work -gives attorneys a strong incentive to increase and even pad their hours. By contrast, they argue that percentage fees reward lawyers for greater recoveries and penalize them for excess hours. Arguing that "the best discipline is self-interest," they conclude that acceptance of contingent fees in class actions would do much to minimize abuse of the class Hence in a class action the attorney has greater discretion in determining the amount of her fee.
Cf. note 10 supra (discussing fee abuse in economically motivated class action suits).
40. See note 37 supra.
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The Class
The class and its representatives may share incentives to settle: the public prestige and status in claiming a favorable settlement in what is often a high-stakes and high-visibility controversy; and the security of some financial recovery. Nonetheless, the desire of the class representatives to settle will ordinarily exceed that of the class members. Since the representatives must invest the time and resources needed to conduct the litigation, they are more likely to be interested in receiving a quick settlement and minimizing their expenses. 41 Class members, on the other hand, may feel that they can receive a more favorable valuation of their claim from a jury than from negotiating parties infected with a strong pro-settlement bias. 42 The risk-averse nature of class representatives may therefore induce them to settle when the class members would prefer to present their claims to a neutral party for decision.
B. The Lack of Checks on the Class Attorney's Conduct
The conflict of interests between the class and its representatives does not alone subvert the settlement process. The structure of the class action suit places the attorney in a situation in which she can too easily use the class action device, intentionally or unintentionally, to further her own interests. The ethical attorney cannot resort to the traditional guidelines for a conflict of interest -informed client guidance and the codes of legal ethics -because these rules do not easily apply in the class action context. Furthermore, the unethical attorney can too easily circumvent the safeguards of rule 23. These weaknesses lead to abuse of the class action process.
In traditional litigation, attorneys can resolve conflicts that are not totally disabling 43 by advising the client of the perceived conflict and allowing him to make informed choices regarding the litigation. 44 Be-41. See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
42. Assessing the value of negotiated settlement awards involves evaluating the negotiating parties' perceived probability of winning (or losing) during a jury trial and their estimates of the litigation costs, monetary as well as nonmonetary, that can be saved by settling. See Rosenfield, supra note 27. Guessing the size of a jury award entails predicting both the probability of winning the class suit and the jury's perception of the value of the class claim. In both cases, attorneys' fees are deducted before the award fund is distributed to the class. There are two scenarios in which the class may be better off with a jury award than with a settlement award. First, if the representatives negotiating on behalf of the class are biased toward settling, there will be a strong tendency to undervalue the class claim during the settlement negotiations. Second, if the class gets better legal representation in exchange for fees paid to conduct a jury trial, the class award may be significantly higher than it would be if the attorney had negotiated a settlement.
43. If the attorney faces an inpermissible conflict of interest, she should remove herself from the case. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment 1 (1983).
44. See MODEL CODE, supra note 29, at EC 5-1; EC 5-16; DR 5-!0l(A). A lawyer should explain to a client the potential advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a class suit as opposed to a private claim. As a class plaintiff, a client can minimize the costs of successful litigation and indicate broad support for his individual position. However, as a class plaintiff, the client will cause the "client" in a class action suit is the class, communication is costly; thus, meaningful client-attorney communication is not practicable. 45 Moreover, communication with the class in pretrial settlement proceedings may jeopardize the class's bargaining position if secrecy and confidentiality are essential to the negotiations.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility fails to provide meaningful guidance to the ethical class action attorney faced with a conflict of interest. The current Code is oriented toward traditional litigation, in which the client is easily defined and that client pays the fee.46 Neither feature, however, is present in class action litigation. 47 Moreover, even though the Code addresses concerns that are pertinent to some aspects of class actions, 48 it fails to provide proper guidance for the class attorney involved in pretrial negotiations. 49 This lack of meaningful guidelines leaves the attorney to her own judgment and thus frees her to make choices that benefit herself instead of the class.
The rule 23 safeguards also fail as an effective check on the attorney's conduct. One of the rule's requirements is that "the representative parties . . . fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 5° Courts have construed this language as charging the named class representative with the duty of insuring that the class attorney fulfills her responsibilities to the class. 51 However, in practice, the ability of the class representative to control the class attorney's conduct is severely limited.
First, courts have never adequately defined the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority between the class representative and attarrecover no more than any other class member, and will be obliged to produce documents, submit to interrogatories, and assume liability for costs and fees if the litigation is unsuccessful. S. 954 (1977) . [Vol. 84:308 ney. 52 Both the class representative and the class action attorney are considered to be fiduciaries for the class. 53 However, the class attol'-ney has the added responsibilities of acting as a fiduciary for the class representative and furthering the public interest. 54 Viewing the duties of the class attorney as coincident with the policy ends of class action litigation, courts have tended to allow the class counsel to control the direction of the suit. 55 For example, an attorney may propose for court approval a settlement that the class representative opposes, 56 or decide not to appeal a court-approved settlement that the representative deems unfavorable. 57 Moreover, if the conduct of the class attorney dissatisfies the class representative, the representative cannot dismiss the attorney, but must instead petition the court for redress. 58 Second, in many instances the class representative lacks the necessary knowledge, interest, or ability to exercise vigorous control over the conduct of the litigation. 59 also barred the class action attorney from being a class representative or a class member. 61 In spite of the courts' efforts to regulate this aspect of class action suits, however, instances of phantom class representatives are not uncommon. 6 2 The economic incentives of the class action structure also discourage vigorous supervision of the class attorney by any individual class member. 63 Because the individual class member's settlement award tends to be small, 64 no member is financially motivated to expend the time and effort required to supervise the attorney closely. Moreover, any increase in the settlement award derived from close supervision of the attorney must be shared with all other class members, making it unlikely that the benefits of supervision will outweigh the costs. 65 As a result of these factors, it is the attorney who typically determines the interests of the class and the parameters of the class action suit. The lack of class control over the attorney's conduct can allow the class attorney to become the de facto representative of the class. 66 Given the divergent interests of the attorney and the class, an ethical attorney may not be able to maintain the neutrality needed to represent the class's interest adequately in settlement negotiations. Moreover, without adequate safeguards, an unethical attorney can deliberately use the class action mechanism to her personal advantage.
II. THE JUDICIAL REsPONSE TO CLASS ACTION ABUSES
The structural weaknesses of rule 23 -the lack of court supervision, the strong incentives for parties to settle, and the relative auton- [ Vol. 84:308 omy of the class action attorney -create a serious potential for abuse in the pretrial settlement negotiations of class action suits. Rule 23(e) charges the court with ensuring that the class action device is not abused. 67 Yet the practical options available to the court under rule 23 are severely limited. 68 The result is that the rule neither prevents abuse nor allows courts to redress the grievances of the absentee class adequately when abuse has already occurred.
Under rule 23, courts must approve any negotiated settlement before it is given binding effect. This requirement is established by section (e) of the rule, which provides in full that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." 69 Section (e) was adopted to preclude abuse of the class action process and to ensure that the procedural rights of the absentee class are not compromised. 70 Under section (e), the court is a fiduciary for the absentee class and the ultimate guardian of its interests. 71 The 71. "The ultimate responsibility of course is committed to the district court in whom, as the guardian of the rights of the absentees, is vested broad administrative, as well as adjudicative, power." Greenfield v. Villagers Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973 Tex. 1977 ) ("Before approving the compromise, the Court must in every instance determine that the proposal is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of all who will be affected by it."); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1797 (1972) ("In general, the standard used by the courts in evaluating a compromise is that the proposal must be fair and reasonable and in the best interests of all those who will be affected by it. ... The main judicial concern is that the rights of the passive class members not be jeopardized by the proposed action."). the product of collusion between the parties?). 73 
A. The Substantive Inquiry
The substantive inquiry requires the court to assess the fairness of the negotiated settlement. To accomplish this, courts have developed a test that balances the strength of the plaintiff's case, the terms of the settlement, and the defendant's ability to pay. 74 In theory, this balancing test should produce a just result, since the court must consider the interests and rights of all parties involved. In practice, however, the balancing test has produced only a superficial examination of the pretrial settlement. 75 Thus, the substantive inquiry ordinarily has not revealed whether the settlement adequately represents the interests of the absentee class.
The substantive test is difficult to apply. The test requires the court to balance the fairness of the settlement against the worthiness of the plaintiff's suit. 76 But "fairness" and "worthiness" are vague terms that do not lend themselves to precise valuation. 77 Moreover, the court's task is made even more difficult because it must evaluate the fairness of the settlement and the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the basis of sketchy pretrial information. 78 Yet it is not just the difficulties encountered in applying the balanc- Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1983 ) (following submission of parties' negotiated settlement, proposed consent decree which addressed and resolved many of plaintiff's concerns was fair, reasonable and adequate and would be approved). In applying the test, the trial judge is to evaluate the following four factors: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's case balanced against the amount offered in the settlement; (2) the defendant's ability to pay; (3) the class action's complexity, length, and expense; and ( 4) the amount of opposition to the settlement. MANUAL FOR COM-PLEX LmGATION, supra note 72, at § 1.46.
77. Cf. note 105 infra. (The difficulty of assessing the fairness of a settlement is exacerbated if the class is inadequately represented during the negotiation process.).
78. Generally, courts have not read the rule 23(e) hearing requirement as a mandate to turn the settlement hearing "into a trial or a rehearsal of the trial" and have limited the scope of the hearing accordingly. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974 ). These courts have reasoned that it would be counterproductive to transform the settlement hearing into a trial on the merits since the whole purpose of compromises, including class action compromises, is to avoid an extensive trial. See Reed v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983) (the court must not try the case in a settlement hearing); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 548 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ; Ohio Pub. Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. l, 6 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (the settlement hearing should not be used to stage a minitrial on the merits, the event that the settlement aims to preclude). [Vol. 84:308 ing test that weaken the substantive inquiry. In addition, the lack of "adversarialness" in the pretrial class action settlement process forces the court into an unjustified passivity. 79 At the settlement hearing the court is presented with only one option -the proposed settlement 80 -which is the product of negotiations between self-interested parties. 81 The present structure of a rule 23 settlement hearing does not ensure that the court will hear an alternative viewpoint, one that could conceivably argue that the proposed settlement was not "fair" to the absentee class. Without a devil's advocate, and without further information, the court is without the resources to utilize its equity powers to refashion the settlement 82 to meet the interests of the absentee class.
A final factor that militates against close scrutiny of the settlement terms is the fact that rejection of the settlement would significantly increase the demands on the court's resources. 83 Class action suits place a much greater burden on the court's time than ordinary litigation: the issues are more complex, tactics may involve more pretrial motions and conferences, and more attorneys and parties are involved. 84 Absent a strong showing of inadequacy, it seems highly unlikely that a court would reject a settlement, especially when the immediate result of doing so would be to burden the court's own 79. Court activism ensures that the interests of the absentee class are not compromised. Outside the pretrial settlement context, the court takes an active role in ensuring that the class action device addresses the interests of the absentee class. For example, courts will often create , subclasses if conflicts within the class are sufficiently pronounced, appoint additional class representatives to ensure adequacy of representation, or order notice to absentee class members. STUD. 349, 360-63 (1978) . docket and leave numerous class claimants without a ready solution to their grievance.
B. The Procedural Inquiry
The lack of a workable substantive standard of review has led courts to focus the settlement inquiry on the procedural aspects of the negotiation process. 85 Under rule 23(d) and (e), a court may provide absentee class members with certain procedural protections to ensure that their interests are adequately represented in the negotiated settlement, 86 whether or not the class has been certified. 87 One of the options available to the court is to order notice to the class members "of any step in the action." 88 Unfortunately, reliance on notice as a prophylactic device is illusory because notice does not ensure a substan- S. 156, 177 (1974) . Rule 23(e) also requires notice whenever a certified class suit is either dismissed or settled. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e). Courts disagree on whether notice to class members of a noncertified class settlement should be mandatory when the settlement calls for dismissal of the class allegation. In Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978 , the court held that the lower court's order of notice of dismissal of a noncertified class claim was an abuse of discretion where there were insufficient facts to show that putative class members had relied on the class representatives to litigate the case. Remanding the case, the Fourth Circuit instructed the lower court to inquire "carefully into the circumstances of the settlement, and [make] findings on whether the settlement was tainted by collusion, or whether absent putative class members, with a reasonable basis for a 'reliance' expectation, would be prejudiced by the settlement." 582 F.2d at 1316. On remand, the district court found that the settlement had been tainted by collusion. The court again ordered notice, arguing that notice should be used as a "prophylactic" device to prevent collusive settlements. Shelton v. Pargo, 81 F.R. D. 637, 640 (W.D.N.C. 1979 ). The court reasoned that the absentee class members were in the best position to evaluate whether their own interests had been compromised. [Vol. 84:308 tively just settlement or prevent egregious abuses of the class action process.
Courts generally order notice to prevent collusive settlements and to ensure that no class member has unduly relied on the representational efforts of the named plaintiffs and thereby forgone the opportunity to bring an individual or class claim. 89 Notice informs the class members of the circumstances and terms of the settlement so that they may object to the proposed settlement or intervene in the suit if they feel their interests have been ignored. Perhaps the most important function of notice is to inform the class members that the statute of limitations, which was tolled during the certification decision, has started to run. 9o
Notice can protect the interests of the absentee class and prevent collusive settlements if it is indeed successful in eliciting a response from the absentee class members. 91 More often than not, however, notice fails to elicit intervention of absentee class members for the same reason that class members fail to control their representatives: an active class member incurs significant expenses without receiving commensurate benefits. 92 Rothman v. Gould 93 illustrates how the inability of notice to elicit an adequate response renders notice an ineffective tool for preventing collusive settlements. 94 In Rothman, the defendant offered to settle 91. Courts' reliance on notice as a prophylactic device is based on the assumptions that notice will reach and be read by the majority of class members and that notice will motivate some class member(s) to intervene in the action. These assumptions are probably faulty. First, class members often have problems in grasping the significance of class suits, even when notice is sent and received. See Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R. D. 313, 321-22 (1973) . Second, notice may not be a sufficient inducement for a class member to take on the responsibilities of representing the class, given that the class representative assumes liability for attorneys' fees and for any mishandling of the class suit. See generally notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, notice may well encourage, rather than discourage, abuse. Notice may attract unscrupulous attorneys who would use intervention in an about-to-be settled class suit as a means of generating fees. Also, notice could make strike suits, see note 94 infra, 94. Collusive settlements are often the product of strike suits brought by putative class representatives. In general, the strike suit takes on one of three forms. In the first, the plaintiff threatens to bring his individual suit as a class action in order to extract a nuisance value settlement. the named plaintiff's individual claim for a sizable sum, but only on the condition that the plaintiff drop his class allegation.9 5 The plaintiff's counsel agreed and petitioned the court to decertify the class in order to "erase the class claims ... so the settlement [could] be consummated. "96 The amendment of the complaint, however, left the class action suit with no representative. In an attempt to solicit a new class representative from among the class members, the court ordered that the members be notified of the status of the suit.9 7 The court noted that the class claim would have to be dismissed if the notice failed to elicit an adequate class representative.9 8 This result eventually occurred because no class member volunteered to represent the class.
If notice fails to elicit a response, as it is likely to do, the court is powerless to prevent the abuse of the class action mechanism. Class representatives and attorneys are then free to use the class action claim as a private bargaining chip and to ignore the legitimate interests of the absentee class.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE
From the foregoing, it appears that courts must depart from their current application of rule 23 if they are to assure negotiated settlements that further the legitimate interests of the absentee class. In tampering with the settlement process, however, the courts must be careful to remedy the ills of rule 23 without seriously undermining other important values. For example, they must eliminate the structural incentives that allow the class action device to be abused without adding significantly to the time and expense of class action litigation. In addition, they must insure that the interests of the absentee class members are adequately represented during the negotiation process without burdening the process to such an extent that settlements, While this type of strike suit significantly undermines the integrity of the judicial process, it does not compromise the reliance interests of putative class members, since there is no mechanism to notify them that a class action has merely been threatened. In the second variation, the plaintiff actually files a class claim and uses the class action allegation to obtain leverage in negotiating for REv. 971 (1971) ; Class Action Developments, supra note 4, at 1541. In a third variation, the plaintiff files the class action suit and obtains certification of the class. The plaintiff then agrees not to amend the complaint to drop the class action allegation and settles without seeking damages for the unnamed plaintiffs. The class is bound by this settlement because it has been certified. Thus, the defendant protects himself from a future class action suit and the plaintiff extracts a higher settlement for herself.
95 [ Vol. 84:308 which are encouraged by the law,99 are impossible to achieve.
A. The Mechanism
A court has broad supervisory powers to insure that the class action process is not abused. 100 Under rule 23, a court may issue orders that affect the conduct of the attorneys, the parties, and any intervenors.101 In addition, rule 83 allows a majority of the judges in a district to make and amend rules governing its "practice" so long as they are not inconsistent with other federal rules of civil procedure. 1 02 However, the court's power to issue orders or institute new court rules is not unlimited; the court must assess whether the rule or order unduly infringes on the legal rights of the parties involved, and whether such infringement is justified by the likelihood of serious abuse.103
Instituting a guardian mechanism is a procedural "modification"104 of rule 23 that can meet these stringent requirements. The guardian mechanism would work in the following manner. After the plaintiff files a complaint alleging a class action suit, the court would appoint a guardian to insure that the interests of the absentee class members are protected. 105 The guardian would not be a party to the (1) the rule or order regulates a "practice," i.e., procedural details and matters not covered by the rules; and (2) the rule or order is consistent with the federal rules, i.e., the existing substantive proceedings, but a friend of the court 106 -a fact finder who aids the judge in insuring that the settlement serves the interests of the absentee class. 107 The mechanism would function only during pretrial, and 70 F.R. D. 533, 535 (S.D. Fla. 1976) . In Miller, the court appointed a guardian ad !item for the class because the assertion that 1845 hours were required to represent the class adequately "lack[ed] credulity." 70 F.R.D. at 536. The court opined:
Because the interest of the class members is specifically adverse to the interest of their lawyers who seek an attorney's fee to be awarded from the settlement fund, the class members must be protected. The attorney for the defendant has little concern for the manner in which the fund is divided. Consequently, the court appointed an experienced attorney as a guardian ad !item for the members of the class. . . . [T] his procedure both achieves protection for the members of the class and enables the trial judge to remain in an impartial position. Counsel for the class strenuously objected to the appointment of a guardian ad !item and asserted that the court should conduct cross examination of the witnesses testifying for plaintiff's counsel. However, that contravenes the court's traditional role, tending to cast the court into an advocate's role. Although specific authority for the appointment of a guardian ad !item is not provided for in Rule 23, it is inherent within Rule 23(d).
70 F.R.D. at 535 (citations omitted). In Haas, the court also appointed a guardian ad !item to represent the interests of the class during the determination of attorneys' fees. The court's reasons for appointing the guardian were similar to those stated in Miller:
Having agreed to contribute a fixed sum of money in settlement of the suit, the proportion of the fund allocated to counsel fees is of no moment to the defendants. Consequently, defendants do not participate in the fee determination proceedings. The unfortunate result is the necessity for the judge to assume the advocate's role left unfilled by the defendants' departure. The dilemma thereby created for the Court finds the judge playing "devil's advocate" on behalf of the disinterested defendants, while at the same time attempting to exercise his impartiality in making a just determination of reasonable fees. To require the judge to occupy an adversary position during the fee proceedings is highly inconsistent with his acknowledged duty to act as an impartial arbitrator. The appointment of a guardian for the class obviates this considerable problem of judicial schizophrenia. 77 F.R.D. at 383 (footnote omitted). In both cases the court found that the inability of the nominal class representative, the class attorney, to represent the class adequately required the appointment of a third party to protect the class's interests. A similar approach -the addition of a neutral third party -is appropriate in pretrial class action settlement negotiations. During this stage of the proceedings, the court cannot ensure that the class is adequately represented. In theory, a guardian should not be necessary because the named plaintiff and the class attorney are obligated to represent the class. But given the inherent conflict of interest faced by the representatives and the lack of effective class control over their conduct, the court cannot reasonably rely on the representatives to speak adequately for the absentee class. See notes 43-66 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, if the class is misrepresented during the negotiation process, the "fairness" standard of the settlement hearing does not insure that the court will detect an inadequate settlement. The court may be able to detect irregularities in the negotiation process, yet be unable to evaluate whether those irregularities produced a collusive settlement because the terms of the improperly negotiated settlement may fall within the range of "fair" possibilities. See Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions -Part II: The Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765, 771-72 (1969) ("[F] aimess may be found anywhere within a broad range of lower and upper limits. No one can tell whether a compromise found to be "fair" might not have been "fairer" had the negotiating [attorney] possessed better information or been animated by undivided loyalty to the cause of the class.").
106. Cf. Wheatley v. Heideman, 251 Iowa 695, 712, 102 N.W.2d 343, 345 (1960) (a guardian is not a party in interest but an aid to assert the rights of the party being represented).
107. Courts already make extensive use of neutral third parties as fact finders in the class action process. The complexity of class action cases have made necessary the appointment of magistrates, masters, and expert witnesses to help manage the class action device. See, e.g., Franks v. Kroger Co., 670 F.2d 71, 72 (6th Cir. 1982 ) (per curiam) (magistrate was responsible for adjudicating the individual discrimination claims); Officers For Justice v. Civil Serv. Commn., 473 F. Supp. 801, 818 (N.D. Cal. 1979 ) (special master appointed to handle the distribution of damages), ajfd., 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. (1983 . Expert witnesses have aided the courts in understanding technical issues. See, e.g., Kaehni v. [Vol. 84:308 only if the parties attempted to negotiate a settlement. Thus, parties wishing to negotiate a settlement would be required to notify the court, and the court would appoint a guardian.1os
Counsel would be required to conduct any negotiations in the presence of the guardian; however, counsel would be free to agree between themselves to expand the role of the guardian from a neutral third party observer to a mediator in the settlement process. As a mediator, the guardian would assist the parties in arriving at a compromise. In this role, the guardian would perform a wide range of functions aimed at conciliation: enhancing communications, presiding over meetings, identifying general areas of agreement, suggesting possible compromises, and perhaps exerting pressure to reach a solution. 109 The Diffraction Co., 342 F. Supp. 523, 527 (D. Md. 1972 ), ajfd., 473 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973 .
108. The guardian mechanism can be seen as an extension of the pretrial conference, which can take many forms. Amended rule 16 emphasizes the pretrial conference as a means of con· trolling and managing complex civil cases. FED. R. Civ. P. 16. Recently, courts have focused on the judge's role in guiding complex litigation. See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 427 (9th Cir. 1979 ), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 936 (E.D. Pa. 1979 ), vacated, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980 Cases, 65 JUDICATURE 415, 417-19 (1982) . Through the pretrial conference, the judge can insist on clear and thoughtful organization, so that complex issues can be presented to the jury in a narrow and simple context. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d at 427; Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. at 936. A more formal pretrial procedure, statutorily enacted, is the medical malpractice screening panel. These panels have been created, in various forms, in 26 states. They are designed to reduce the volume of nonmeritorious suits and to encourage pretrial settlements of medical malpractice cases. A typical panel, such as the one used in Arizona, is composed of a judge, a lawyer, and a physician. It conducts an evidentiary hearing, in which participation is mandatory, to determine whether there is enough evidence to support a claim against each defendant. The actual gain in efficiency brought by this type of panel has been questioned by attorneys and judges. See Bedlin & Nejelski, supra note 1, at 11; Howard, An Evaluation of Medical Liability Review Panels in Arizona, ST. Cr. J., Spring 1981, at 19, 23 . Court annexed arbitration is another prehearing procedure that automatically refers a case to a neutral third party, other than the judge, to promote early settlement of the case. One version is the "Quick Look" concept where disputants agree to present the merits of their case in an abbreviated procedure. For example, the Northern District of Ohio has adopted a procedure in which each party is given one hour to make an opening statement, submit a summation of the evidence, and make a closing argument before six jurors who deliberate and render a nonbinding verdict. The parties are given two weeks to consider the jury's findings and may request a full trial de novo if they are not satisfied. If the parties preferred to limit the guardian's role to that of neutral third-party observer, the guardian would not participate in the settlement negotiations, but would be present at all meetings. The parties would be free to discuss their positions, offers, and counteroffers. If the parties arrived at a settlement that they wished to submit for court approval, the guardian would prepare a nonbinding written memorandum, disclosed only to the judge, outlining the parties' relative strengths and weaknesses as revealed during the negotiations. The court would use this memorandum as an independent source of information 110 to evaluate the substantive terms of the settlement at the approval hearing. 111
B. The Advantages
The advantage of the guardian mechanism is that it offers a procedural solution to the structural causes of abuse in class action settlements. By including a neutral third party in the pretrial settlement process, the mechanism ensures that the negotiation process is not subverted by the self-interests of the class representatives. If pretrial negotiations remain uncorrupted, a court is in a better position to protect the interests of the absentee class during the settlement hearing. 112
The introduction of a neutral third party during the settlement negotiations strikes down the veil of secrecy that facilitates improper settlements. It also prevents the plaintiff from using the class action allegation simply as leverage during the negotiations. 113 If attorneys did attempt this, the guardian would be free to inform the court. The court could then review the situation and prevent rather than merely punish abuses. 110. The lack of adequate information is a major obstacle confronting a court in its attempt to carry out its duties under rule 23. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
111. Knowing that the confidential guardian report would serve as a rough guideline for the trial judge in the settlement hearing, the parties would be motivated to make realistic representations of their positions and offers during the negotiations, thus precluding "unofficial" negotiations. The court could further ensure that the mechanism not be evaded by stipulating that the absence of the guardian during the negotiation process establishes presumptive proof of collusion. In order to make substantial use of the guardian's contribution, the court should also insist that the guardian render as objective a representation as possible.
112 114. Although the problem of padding of attorneys' fees is not fully treated in this Note, the guardian mechanism could be used to prevent this type of abuse because the guardian could verify that activities undertaken on behalf of the class were not duplicative of other attorneys' efforts. Also, the guardian could keep a tally of the hours that she spends on the settlement [Vol. 84:308 By allowing the court to undertake a more informed substantive review of the class action settlement, the guardian mechanism enables the court to detect collusive settlements. Presently, review of the settlement terms is superficial rather than truly substantive because courts are not afforded the options 115 or information 116 with which to fashion an equitable settlement. The proposed system would solve these problems. Courts could use the guardian's report as an independent source of information in evaluating the substantive fairness of the settlement terms. Moreover, the guardian mechanism could secure the relevant information without compromising the neutrality of the court, because the court itself would not be involved in the pretrial negotiation process. 117 At the settlement hearing, the court could use the information furnished by the guardian to reject those settlement terms that harm the interests of the absentee class, or to suggest ways that the compromise could be refashioned. 118 negotiations. The guardian's report of hours, with an evaluation of the difficulty of the issues discussed, could provide the court with a rough estimate of the hours an attorney would need to work to represent the class adequately. If the attorney greatly exceeded the necessary hours, her fee could be adjusted accordingly. Cf. [A] preliminary determination of the merits may result in substantial prejudice to a def en· dant, since of necessity it is not accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures appli· cable to civil trials. The court's tentative findings, made in the absence of established safeguards, may color the subsequent proceedings and place an unfair burden on the defendant. During the negotiation, the guardian should remain neutral in order to facilitate a mediation process in which the parties themselves negotiate an acceptable settlement. The guardian's main objective should be to gauge the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' contentions. Because the judge would not be a part of the pretrial settlement negotiations, she would be able to maintain the neutrality required to determine, at the settlement hearing, whether the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. In making these determinations, however, the judge would have the benefit of the guardian's inside observations. 118. The settlement process would then resemble the negotiation of a consent decree. As described by Judge Chayes, the consent decree enables the parties to control the outcome of the litigation, "[e]ach party recogniz [ing] that it must make some response to the demands of the other party, for issues left unresolved will be submitted to the court, a recourse that is always chancy •.
•. " Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 REV. , 1299 REV. (1976 ; see also Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term -Foreword: The Forums of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979) (arguing that judges have a duty to uncover the inadequacies of the class action device and solve them creatively).
C. Feasibility
The advantages of the guardian mechanism should be weighed against the potential disadvantages -the monetary cost of instituting the mechanism and the infringement on the rights of the parties involved. Fortunately, these potential problems are not insurmountable.
A fixed salary for the guardian would best serve the goals of the guardian mechanism. It would insure the neutrality and thus the credibility of the guardian by removing any economic incentive to prolong negotiations -an incentive that accompanies a system of hourly or daily pay. Under this proposal, the guardian would be contracted for a specific time period that could be extended as necessary.
To finance the guardian mechanism the court would need to establish a fund. This could be done by setting aside a nominal percentage, perhaps one percent, of all settlement funds produced in class action suits. 119 The court could also supplement the guardian fund by imposing a monetary penalty on meritless class action suits. 120 This penalty would also discourage vexatious litigation. 121 To ease the financial burden, members of the bar wishing to perform pro bono work could volunteer to be guardians. Other "free" potential guardians are federal magistrates, already paid on a salary basis. 122 The court could ensure that the guardian mechanism did not infringe on the rights of the parties by a court order delineating the scope of the guardian's activity. 123 The order should emphasize that the guardian is not to supplant the judge or to advocate a position. If the guardian violated the court order, the parties could petition the court for redress. 124 The court could then take the appropriate remedial measures, including dismissal of the guardian. In addition, the guardian should be required to document all her activities. This 667, 680-83 (1980) (where the Court held that a magistrate's findings are not final but the district court judge can use them in his final determination without a de novo hearing).
[ Vol. 84:308 would ensure that the guardian did not overstep the bounds delineated by the court as well as provide an adequate record for review. 125 Adding a third party to the negotiating process could be seen as an infringement on the private negotiating rights of the parties. However, the confidentiality that may be required in settling private claims is not necessarily justified in the class action context. In that context, more is involved than the negotiating parties' private concerns. Also of the import are the interests of the absentee class members and society's interest in preventing abuse of the class action mechanism. Moreover, it is not necessary for the guardian to be an intrusive force in the negotiating process. Indeed, the parties themselves have some control over the degree of the guardian's intrusion since they determine whether the guardian is to act as a passive third-party observer or an active mediator. 126 Therefore, the guardian mechanism should not unduly disrupt the settlement process. Instead, it should preclude only those settlements resulting from an improper use of the class action device. 127 
CONCLUSION
The guardian mechanism is not designed to eliminate all of the intrinsic weaknesses of the class action device. Rather, the guardian mechanism attempts to preclude abuse of the class action device during the pretrial negotiation stage of a class action suit, when the class action device is most vulnerable to abuse. By appointing a neutral third party to preside over the settlement negotiations, the court can maintain the integrity of the settlement process. This will help guarantee a responsible substantive review hearing rather than the current superficial scrutiny that at best can detect the possibility of abuse, but cannot adequately address the problem. Thus, the guardian mechanism furthers the policy ends of rule 23. It precludes collusive settlements and guarantees that the interests of the absentee class are considered at the settlement hearing without discouraging class action litigation.
-Sylvia R. Lazos 125. Cf. Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 435 (1968) ("It is essential ••• that a reviewing court have some basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at after a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and mere boiler-plate approval phrased in appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts or analysis of the law.").
126. See text accompanying note 109 supra. 127. Cf. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 n.20 (7th Cir.) ("To the extent [that an inquiry into the conduct of the negotiations] discourages settlements, it should only discourage those negotiated in circumstances so irregular as to cast substantial doubt on their fairness."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979) .
